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or the European Union, the development of 
closer ties with Tajikistan within the context of 
the broader effort to forge a Strategy for the 
Central Asia could represent a significant opportunity. 
Tajikistan occupies a geographically peripheral 
position, but it is precisely this location outside the 
limelight – and therefore not so subject to the pressures 
of geopolitics and the struggle for energy resources 
that shapes much of the politics of the rest of the 
region – that could allow the EU to foster new forms 
of cooperation with the local authorities and to devise 
policies aimed at strengthening the Tajik state’s 
capacities and stability, which would significantly 
assist reform and development in the country. This 
would mean building on the encouraging 
developments taking place in bilateral relations and 
taking additional steps aimed at achieving the goals 
above in a more effective way.  
The international community has typically looked at 
Tajikistan through the lenses of conflict prevention and 
post-conflict reconstruction. This has meant that 
bilateral relations have become routinised, and stasis 
rather than critical engagement has been the defining 
element of international strategies towards the country. 
It is argued here that it is now time to dispose of this 
framework and to begin to deal with Tajikistan as a 
‘normal country’
1. Such a paradigm change would 
offer the European Union key opportunities, namely 
operating in a country that after the war has 
experienced relative stability (unlike some of its 
neighbours) and where, as a result, there is now the 
possibility to concentrate on advancing reform. 
Further, progress in key areas in Tajikistan would offer 
the opportunity to promote similar policies elsewhere 
in the region.  
                                                 
1 A similar point has been made in J. Heathershaw, “The 
paradox pf peacebuilding: Peril, promise and small arms in 
Tajikistan”, Central Asian Survey, 24(1), 2005, pp. 21-38. 
Historical challenges facing the 
modern Tajik state and nation 
The formation of Tajikistan was the consequence of 
the Soviet process of national delimitation and the 
territorial-administrative re-organisation of Central 
Asia (1924-36). Home to sedentary and nomadic 
communities until the Russian conquest in the late 19
th 
century, the populations of Central Asia largely lacked 
experience of modern statehood. Instead, several forms 
of allegiance co-existed and overlapped: at the supra-
national level (Islam) and at the local level (city and 
regional affiliations). National loyalties had also hardly 
developed among the peoples of the region. The Soviet 
effort to introduce new forms of political organisations 
and identity in Central Asia, therefore, played a 
formative role in shaping the Tajik state and the Tajik 
nation.  
As a result of the process of national-territorial 
delimitation in Central Asia during the 1920s and 
1930s – which established five entities (Union 
Republics) each of which bore the semblances of a 
state (with constitutions, flags, anthems, parliaments), 
but remained deprived of sovereignty, which rested 
with the Soviet state – Tajikistan was created in 1929 
as the last piece in the regional puzzle. Tajikistan had 
previously been part of the Uzbek Union Republic 
(SSR), endowed with a lower degree of autonomy 
(Autonomous Republic).  
With no history of previous independent statehood and 
no sense of political, institutional or even cultural 
coherence, different portions of territory were 
assembled to create a Tajik Republic. Historical 
centres of Persian/Tajik culture, such as the cities of 
Bukhara and Samarkand, were assigned to the Uzbek 
SSR. The Tajik Republic comprised the south-western 
part of the Ferghana Valley (around Khujand), the 
Pamir areas (later to become Gorno-Badakhshan), the 
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Hissar and Gharm valleys and the southern regions of 
Khatlon and Qurghonteppa along the Afghan border. 
A  modus vivendi was established during the Soviet 
period, which allowed different regions to occupy 
distinct niches in the political and economic system of 
the country. At the same time, the division of the 
region left many in Tajikistan with a strong sense of 
historical injustice in terms of the loss of the 
‘heartland’ of Tajik culture and the creation of a 
substantial number of co-ethnics concentrated in the 
Uzbek Republic. 
Tajikistan from conflict to 
reconstruction 
In the early 1990s, social and political order collapsed 
in Tajikistan when the liberalisation initiated by 
Gorbachev led to a sudden shift in power relations in 
the republic. As a result of these changes, the 
precarious political balance put in place by the Soviets 
to rule the diverse regions of the republic was shattered 
and the country virtually imploded. A sudden and 
particularly brutal civil war erupted in 1992 and 
although by 1993 the bloodiest phase of the conflict 
was over, formally the conflict continued until 1997, 
when a peace agreement was signed by representatives 
of the government forces and opposition factions. The 
Peace Accord set in place a power-sharing agreement 
where, at least formally, the government conceded to 
the opposition a role in the power structure and 
institutions. Ten years later, Tajikistan has slowly, but 
steadily emerged from the abyss of the civil war to a 
process of state formation and integration with the 
regional and international system.  
For the larger part of the past decade, analysts and 
policy-makers have tended to look at Tajikistan’s post-
war course through the lenses of conflict prevention 
and post-conflict reconstruction. While this frame is 
not incorrect per se, this brought with it an implicit 
assumption that because Tajikistan was on a course of 
precarious recovery from the war, criticism of failed 
progress should be kept to a minimum to avoid the risk 
of derailing the post-conflict course, altering the 
fragile agreement and, in the end, plunging the country 
back into bloodshed. Though moderate encouragement 
was sensible, continuing to look at Tajikistan through 
the lenses of post-conflict reconstruction is turning 
post-war dynamics into stasis (perhaps even allowing 
the emergence of authoritarian politics).  
Faced with this situation, the new approach to Central 
Asia being developed by the EU offers the opportunity 
to re-engage with Tajikistan at a vital stage in its post-
independence history and, in particular, to introduce 
new policies that can assist the development of the 
country and avert the drift into authoritarianism. We 
argue in this paper that the focus of the EU’s 
engagement with Tajikistan should be on three main 
issue areas: security and stability, economic 
transformation, and democratisation and political 
reform. 
Security and stability 
The draft of the EU Strategy for Central Asia identifies 
security and stability in the region as its key strategic 
interests. In this respect Tajikistan has come a long 
way from the abyss of the civil war during the 1990s. 
In the early post-war period, occasional episodes of 
unrest and insurgencies have continued even after the 
peace accord. Former warlords, disgruntled political 
figures and factions, or even renegade elements of the 
Tajik army have periodically challenged the authority 
of the centre. Former Tajik army Colonel Makhmud 
Khudoberdiev’s occasional insurgencies in the late 
1990s are typical of the type of challenges that 
persisted in the aftermath of the peace accord. 
Allegedly with the backing of neighbouring 
Uzbekistan, Khudoberdiev attempted a mutiny in 
southern Tajikistan 1997 and later attacked 
government buildings in the northern province in what 
appeared as a failed coup in 1998. The turbulent period 
continued, with Yoqub Solimov, former warlord and 
key ally of Rakhmonov, also plotting against the 
authorities.  
After years of confrontation with former allies and 
warlords,
2 President Rakhmonov has been able to 
consolidate his position and that of the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT).
3 This has 
brought the marginalisation of former warlords 
previously associated with the administration, but 
consolidation of power has come to the expense of 
legitimate dissent. The political opposition as well as 
the media have been subject to tighter restrictions in 
what appears to be a decisive turn towards 
authoritarian policies. At the same time the country has 
remained remarkably stable and has not experienced 
the convulsions and unrest that have taken place in 
neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajik 
authorities have, nevertheless, faced the accusation of 
connivance or ineptitude with respect to control over 
the country’s borders, as militants have been reported 
to have infiltrated Uzbek and Kyrgyz territory from the 
Tajik side of the border.  
Since 2000, European assistance to enhance border 
security and combat drugs trafficking has come 
through two related programmes: the ‘Border 
Management Programmes for Central Asia’ (BOMCA) 
and the ‘Central Asia Drug Action Programme’ 
(CADAP).
4 These programmes cover a number of 
areas (legal assistance, assistance at the customs, 
                                                 
2 This includes the removal from official posts of former 
field commanders Saidsho Shamolov and the Cholov 
brothers (Varorud, 21 January 2002). 
3 Actually the ruling circles seem to come all from the 
President’s village of Dunghara in the southern Kulob 
region, causing wider resentment among the excluded 
groups from other parts of the country or even elsewhere in 
Kulob. 
4 The budget allocated to BOMCA/CADAP is of about 
€36.5 million for the period 2001-08.  
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intelligence, human resources, drug abuse prevention) 
designed to improve security in the Central Asian 
region. Security at borders has in fact improved in 
recent years, but the clashes between border guards 
and criminal groups linked to drugs trafficking that 
took place along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border in 2006
5 are 
a reminder that more should be done in this area. Local 
communities and economies have traditionally thrived, 
thanks to ‘shuttle trade’ and the EU should encourage 
measures that enhance border security, but this should 
not come at the expense of promoting cross-border 
trade. 
Economic transformation 
The Tajik economy has grown significantly in recent 
years, which is obviously a welcome development. 
The GDP has risen at an annual average of 9.6% since 
2000.
6 Industrial production expanded, and so did 
agricultural output. Domestic consumption also grew 
as a result of a rise in salaries and especially of the 
remittances of Tajik migrants abroad. Poverty 
reduction measures, also through the TACIS 
programme, have also helped to decrease the poverty 
rate from 81% in 1999 to 64% of the population in the 
mid-2000s.  
There are nevertheless worrying signs that raise 
questions about the long-term prospects for the 
country’s economic development. The Tajik economy 
has been dependent on three main sources of revenue, 
none of which bodes well for the long-term viability of 
the country’s economy: remittances from Tajik 
migrants, trafficking of narcotics and international aid. 
The paradoxical situation here is that all three 
converge to make Tajikistan a rentier state, which is a 
state whose revenue depends on a small number of 
resources. The trafficking of narcotics risks turning the 
country into a ‘narcostate’
7 and while some progress 
has been made and drug seizure levels have increased 
significantly in recent years, the administration has 
sent mixed signals. On the one hand attempts to curb 
corruption among border guards and the severing of 
ties with former warlords involved in narco-trafficking 
is a welcome development. On the other, this process 
appears selective, as the appointment of former 
General Ghaffor Mirzoev (a former PFT commander
8) 
to head the State Drugs Control Agency raises doubts 
                                                 
5 RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), “Central 
Asia: Fighting erupts along Tajik-Kyrgyz Border”, 12 May 
2006 (available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/ 
2006/05/2c513239-7c60-433a-a87e-37112536b9be.html). 
6 World Bank, World Bank Indicators (2001-2005), 
Washington, D.C. 
7 E. Marat, “Impact of Drug Trade and Organized Crime on 
State Functioning in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan”, China and 
Eurasia Quarterly Forum, 4(1), 2006, p. 105. 
8 The PFT (Popular Front of Tajikistan) was one of the 
militias that fought in the civil war on the side of the 
‘government faction’.  
over the seriousness of the Rakhmonov administration 
in this regard.
9 
Two other sources of revenue have contributed to 
enabling the population to cope with post-war 
hardship: remittances from labour migrants and 
poverty-alleviation measures. It is difficult to imagine 
how the growing Tajik population would have 
survived without remittances and international aid. It is 
estimated that the annual remittances from labour 
migrants amount to about $6-8 billion,
10 approximately 
the size of the country’s GDP. At the same time, 
however, there are limits to the benefits these measures 
bring to economic development; they are palliatives, 
not solutions. 
Action should be directed to help the Tajik economy to 
diversify and, thereby, to rely less on the fluctuations 
of global commodity prices. Tajikistan should also be 
more effectively integrated into the international 
economic system: the energy sector is an area where 
the country’s potential has not yet been adequately 
developed. Plans to channel Central Asian hydropower 
resources southwards would demand that Tajikistan’s 
infrastructure undergoes serious upgrading if the 
country is to benefit from transit trade.
11 This move 
would fit well with US strategy in Central and South 
Asia, but not necessarily the EU’s. This is not a 
problem in itself and external actors can effectively 
synergise in the various projects while retaining a 
distinct agenda. Instead, there is a large potential for 
investing in developing Tajikistan’s hydroelectric 
power, either independently or in coordination with 
Russian companies.
12 
Democratisation and political reform  
Although progress has been made in the areas of 
security/stability and economic development (with all 
the caveats outlined above), it is in the area of political 
reform that the country is lagging behind. The two 
main challenges here are the criminalisation of 
political life and the overall institutional weakness of 
the Tajik state. Warlordism has been successfully 
                                                 
9 Analogous situations occurred in the cases of Mirzokhujo 
Nizomov, Hokim Kalandarov and Salamsho 
Muhabbatshoev, who were also elevated to key positions in 
official institutions (K. Nourzhanov, “Saviours of the nation 
or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan”, Central 
Asian Survey, 24(2), 2005, p. 124). 
10 See Marat, op. cit. 
11 This is an area that has been recently explored by the 
United States as well. The United States Trade and 
Development Agency (USTDA) in particular has 
commissioned feasibility studies in relation to the 
rehabilitation of existing power projects (Qayraqqum and 
Varzob) and the possibility to channel Tajikistan’s resources 
southwards to Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
12 Iran has also begun developing the country’s hydropower 
potential (see E. Marat, “Iran, Tajikistan strengthen 
cooperation in the energy sector”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 
February 2006).  
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contained since the end of the civil war and warlords 
have either been jailed, pushed out of political life or 
killed. As President Rakhmonov’s authority in the 
country has consolidated, potential challenges by 
former warlords and allies have been gradually 
sidelined. Although this is positive in terms of 
consolidating a central authority in the country, these 
criminal groups have not been totally neutralised and 
much remains to be done in this area.
13 The emphasis 
in the current draft of the EU Strategy for Central Asia 
on the importance of rule of law, human rights, good 
governance and the presence of transparent political 
institutions for the ‘development of a stable political 
framework and functioning economic structures’ is to 
be welcomed, and a strategy of critical engagement 
(combining encouragement with criticism, when 
appropriate) should help shape reform, despite the 
region’s many recalcitrant actors.  
The consolidation of formal institutions is taking place 
only gradually (if at all) and much of the politics in 
Tajikistan occurs through informal institutions. Patron-
client networks dominate both the politics of the centre 
and the regions. The interplay between formal and 
informal institutions, however, need not be seen as 
necessarily conflictual.
14 While warlordism is certainly 
detrimental to the process of political reform in the 
country, working alongside local authority figures can 
contribute to make formal and informal institutions 
convergent towards the goal of initiating political 
reform. This should not be understood as suggesting 
that the EU should work with people outside the law. 
Rather, it should attempt to work along with traditional 
institutions such as the avlod (an institution comprising 
community elders and regulating relations among 
community members with shared kinship ties
15) and 
the  mahalla  (neighbourhood community) to ensure 
that local community leaders have a stake in the 
system and particularly in the functioning of the 
system. This is an area that has thus far not received 
sufficient attention from the European Union, which 
has preferred to emphasise the role of formal 
institutions.  
EU-Tajikistan relations have traditionally been 
governed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Communities and Tajikistan 
during the 1990s. It will be replaced by the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which represents 
                                                 
13 E. Marat, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, Silk Road Papers, Johns Hopkins University 
(Baltimore, MD) and Uppsala University (Uppsala, 
Sweden), October 2006. 
14 A similar point (at a more general level, and not specific 
to the case in question) has been in G. Helmke and S. 
Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A 
Research Agenda”, Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 2004, pp. 
725-739. 
15 B.V. Babajanian, “The social exclusion framework and 
poverty reduction strategy in Tajikistan”, Central Asian 
Survey, 25(4), 2006, p. 409.  
the framework within which the European Union has 
dealt with the individual Central Asian states. The 
PCA with Tajikistan, signed in 2004, is awaiting 
ratification by the EU members, and pending that, an 
Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters 
signed on 1 May 2005, will provide the 
implementation of trade-related provisions of the PCA. 
The PCA covers a number of traditional policy areas 
(including political dialogue, economic cooperation, 
democracy and human rights, prevention of illegal 
activities, cultural and financial cooperation), as well 
as new areas of common interest, such as weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), migration and terrorism 
reflecting the changes in the post-cold war 
international system. The importance of establishing 
rule of law, democracy and continuing political reform 
occupies a somewhat more peripheral place in the later 
articles of the PCA and more should be said about how 
the EU intends to operate in a way that takes into 
account the realities on the ground of how Tajik social 
and political relations are actually conducted.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
Humanitarian relief, poverty alleviation, border 
management and drug control (BOMCA/CADAP), 
and civil society promotion have been among the areas 
on which the EU has focused its relations with 
Tajikistan. Noticeable progress has been achieved in 
the past and the PCA shows that there is a will to 
develop relations further on both sides, provided that 
the key priorities outlined in the document are not 
diluted in a myriad of other issues. The breadth of the 
document can come to the detriment of its depth. 
The approach that informs the PCA agreement, namely 
the focus on Tajikistan as a post-conflict country, has, 
however, outlived its initial purpose, and it is hoped 
that the EU Strategy will take this into account. 
Tajikistan is more than a peripheral country located in 
a hardly accessible area of Central Asia. Unlike 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the country has been far 
from the limelight in recent years and this provides a 
good opportunity for emphasising cooperation in a 
number of key issues. Relations between Tajikistan 
and the EU have intensified over the years. The 
signature of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement certainly constitutes an attempt to bring 
them to the next level, but for the full potential of the 
partnership to be fulfilled, a number of actions should 
be taken that would directly identify and tackle 
problem areas, as outlined below.  
1. Work with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 
and Russia and China. There are several areas in 
which the interests of the EU converge with those of 
the above actors. Combating drugs trafficking and 
arms smuggling, as well as enhancing border security 
are common goals at the state, regional, and 
international levels. The waning of US influence in the 
region has opened a space that has been filled by the 
swift return of Russia and a growing Chinese  
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economic presence, as exemplified by the formation 
and consolidation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), a regional organisation created in 
2001, involving Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
16 Russian and 
Tajik forces have cooperated on issues of border 
security and drug control for more than a decade. 
These are capital projects that other actors, including 
the EU, should build on. While Russia may not have 
been keen on sharing the provision of Tajikistan’s 
security to other powers, the EU could encourage the 
SCO to become a stronger regional organisation that 
could actually undertake operations in its member 
states, for example on the Tajik-Afghan border, where 
joint activities could be conducted with the EU in a 
way that would make the EU less intrusive and thus 
less menacing to Russia and other local actors.  
2. Talk to the local community figures. Patronage 
politics is endemic in the country and much of the 
political and economic developments occur outside the 
formal institutional framework. It should instead 
engage the local community leaders in the avlod and 
mahalla and make sure they have a stake in the 
system, so that cooperating with the EU will not 
simply mean benefiting from aid being ‘parachuted’ 
into a particular region, but will give them a stake in 
the reform process. Such local authority figures have 
played an important role in maintaining social stability 
and preventing conflicts from re-occurring.
17 While 
patron-client relations may not have a positive impact 
on democratisation in the short term, informal 
institutions have played a crucial role in maintaining 
stability in the region and their role should not be 
discounted. Informal authority figures constitute ‘entry 
points’ to the system and working alongside them (and 
not against them) would give them a stake in the 
system and international actors access to local society.  
2. Press the authorities to alleviate the pressure on 
political opposition and liberalising the system. A 
useful initial step could involve alleviating the pressure 
on local and international NGOs and the media as well 
as the gradual opening up of the political system. 
                                                 
16 Established as an intergovernmental organisation whose 
main goal was to establish mutual confidence between the 
member states and increase cooperation in border regions, 
the SCO has grown to become one of – if not the – most 
important regional organisation in Central Asia. It is the only 
one whose membership includes Russia and China. All the 
Central Asian republics, barring Turkmenistan, are also 
members. The SCO’s main strategic objective is the fight 
against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. In 
light of the recurrent calls for US withdrawal from the 
region, however, one may also add to these the reduction of 
the US presence and influence in Central Asia.  
17 A similar argument was made in relation to the role played 
by the leaders of ethnic minority groups in managing and 
defusing inter-ethnic grievances tensions in M. Fumagalli, 
“Informal (ethno-)politics and local authority figures in Osh, 
Kyrgyzstan”, Ethnopolitics, 6(2), forthcoming, 2007 pp. 1-
23. 
Political opposition exists, inside and outside the 
parliament, but it remains under increasingly tight 
restrictions set by the authorities. The EU should 
establish clear benchmarks for measuring progress and 
should not refrain from highlighting problem areas. 
Cooperation to contain the rise of radical Islamist 
groups should be expected, but combating terrorism 
should not be used by the government as an excuse to 
target all opposition. Tajikistan has been less exposed 
to this type of threat than the neighbouring republics, 
also as a result of the fact that an Islamic party is legal 
in the country, but the lack of outlets for voicing 
demands and channelling dissent may lead to a rise in 
popularity of what at present are fringe militant 
groups.  
3. Establish a legal framework to prevent abuse of 
Tajik migrants in Russia. Attention should also focus 
on issues of human rights with regard to Tajik 
migrants in Russia (and elsewhere). The EU could 
work in concert with the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and help delineate a legal 
framework to improve working and living conditions 
of migrants in the host country as well as in exerting 
pressure on the Russian authorities to ensure that 
abuses are not the norm. 
4. Criminalisation of the political life, corruption and 
institutional weakness.  These problems continue to 
represent fundamental challenges to the Tajik polity 
and society as a whole. The EU should increase 
pressure on the ruling administration to sever links 
between state officials and criminal elements (most 
notably the Minister for Emergency Situations, former 
warlord Mirzo Ziyoev
18). Tajikistani authorities and 
the EU should agree on a realistic timeline for 
introducing substantial reforms and for monitoring 
progress.  
5. Develop Tajikistan’s energy sector. Developing 
hydroelectric power is an area that is crucial for 
achieving long-term viability of the Tajik economy 
and is fundamental for the whole region’s economy 
too. Russian and now Iranian companies have begun 
investing in rehabilitating and upgrading existing 
hydropower plants. The EU should work in concert 
with other actors to favour the development of 
Tajikistan’s unfulfilled potential in hydro-electric 
power in the region. The EU should also concentrate 
its efforts on facilitating bilateral and multilateral 
approaches to deal with disputes over water use and 
management as well as to develop water infrastructure 
(working in cooperation with local authorities to 
                                                 
18 Ziyoev was one of the leading figures in the United Tajik 
Opposition, which fought against the Rakhmonov faction in 
the civil war, but that was re-integrated as part of the 
reconciliation process. Another former warlord, the Interior 
Ministry’s Special Force Brigade commander, Major-
General Suhrob Qosimov resigned in March 2007 
(ASIAPlus, 13 March 2007).  
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prevent potential environmental disasters resulting 
from the poor security of existing structures).  
6. Upgrade the country’s transport infrastructure. The 
movement of peoples and goods within the country 
requires far too long on bumpy roads. Roads 
connecting the capital Dushanbe with some of the 
major regional centres (Kulob, Khujand, Khorog) 
require urgent upgrading. In addition, attention could 
also focus on upgrading airport facilities (runways) 
and technical maintenance of ageing aircrafts.  
7. Make the education and training of the local youth a 
priority. A central concern of international assistance 
programmes across the region has been the formation 
of the younger strata of the Central Asian population. 
This is particularly important in light of the fact that 
the Central Asian youth represents an increasingly 
large part of the region’s overall population; about 
37.9% of Tajikistan’s population is under the age of 
14,
19 and it is inevitable to wonder about their future in 
a country in which the safety valve for the young 
(especially male) population has been migration. 
Unemployment, drug use, poor health and declining 
levels of literacy are among the key challenges that the 
younger generation faces.
20 The EU should continue 
its focus on youth and education; establishing a 
‘European Education Initiative in Central Asia’ as 
indicated in the draft strategy is therefore an important 
step in this direction. In addition it should seek to 
coordinate its efforts with other organisations, such as 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as 
well as with Japan, which recently upgraded its 
assistance to the region. The aim should be the 
improvement of the quality of education provided in 
the country, through teaching training programmes, a 
rise in government spending in primary and secondary 
education and the expansion of scholarships and 
exchange programmes, but also tighter controls on 
corruption in schools and universities.  
8. Enhance EU visibility. The EU has played an 
important role in many forms and areas in Tajikistan, 
but its presence, although beneficial, is often not 
visible and this means that outside narrow elite circles, 
the ordinary population is not aware of its actions. 
Increasing visibility could take several forms. At a 
diplomatic level this would entail strengthening the 
diplomatic representation of the EU in Tajikistan, as 
well as developing closer contacts with the national 
parliament. Additional measures could comprise 
improving the institutional and infrastructural 
cohesiveness of the country, such as airports and 
roads, upgrading the country’s hydroelectric power 
stations and assisting and training Tajik forces. 
                                                 
19 Data (July 2006 est.) are taken from the CIA World 
Factbook Tajikistan, available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/ti.html#People (accessed 18 
March 2007). 
20 Crisis Group, Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New 
Generation, Asia Report No. 66, Brussels, 31 October 2003.  
To conclude, this paper has argued that the ‘post-
conflict reconstruction’ framework that has dominated 
international strategies with Tajikistan for large part of 
the post-war period has now outlived its initial 
purpose. The EU has now an opportunity to make a 
difference to the country’s prospects for economic 
development and socio-political modernisation if it 
adopts a strategy of critical engagement, whereby it 
monitors and rewards progress, does not hesitate to 
identify areas where reforms are lagging behind, and 
places pressure on actors seeking to oppose change. 
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